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ABSTRACT: Some observers of the EU have expressed concern about the quality of its 
democratic governance. Such sentiments are reflected in much of the research conducted on 
attitudes toward the EU and voting in European Parliament elections, both of which seek to 
assess the vibrancy of public engagement with the European project. Yet few—if any—have 
considered other types of behavior that may be associated with an active EU citizenry. This 
paper uses original survey data from the United Kingdom to complement existing research by 
identifying a fuller picture of the types and frequency of EU participation. We also assess the 
extent to which predictors from existing public opinion literature (identity threat, economic 
concerns, political attitudes and sociodemographics) predict these various types of participation. 
Results suggest that citizens pursue a wide array of participation avenues and that different sets 
of motivations underpin these different types of EU engagement. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: European identity, political participation 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for the 14
th
 Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, 
March 5-7, 2015 in Boston. K. Amber Curtis gratefully thanks Opinium Research, LLP for its 
assistance administering this survey, made possible by funding from the Colorado European 
Union Center of Excellence and the Center for British and Irish Studies at the University of 
Colorado Boulder. 
2 
 
 Since the Danish rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 1990s, scholars have 
intensely debated the democratic quality of the European Union (EU)—or lack thereof. Many 
point to the public’s apparent lack of desire to engage at the European level and claim that the 
EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’ and the absence of a lively public sphere (e.g., 
Rorschneider 2002; Schmitter 2000). Empirical investigations in this vein have been largely 
limited to two types of mass political behavior at the European level: voting in European 
Parliament (EP) elections and general support for (or opposition to) European integration. But 
are these the only avenues through which EU citizens might “engage” with the EU? We argue 
no:  there exist a number of other behaviors that might reflect a vibrant European citizenry. To 
better understand if and how the public engages with the EU, we develop a theoretical 
framework to identify multiple types of participation and then examine patterns of behavior to 
test whether our expectations hold.  
 More specifically, we assert that various types of behavior have been overlooked when it 
comes to measuring EU participation, and that these different acts—some positive, some 
negative—should be taken into account in order to produce a full picture of European 
engagement. We expect, first, that similar types of behavior will cluster together and, second, 
that these resulting modes of behavior may be explained by slightly different combinations of 
factors. After reviewing the basics of political participation in Europe, we develop a conceptual 
framework to account for four different categories through which participation may take place: 
information-seeking, expressions of pride, taking advantage of EU benefits, and protest. A fifth 
category applies to those who intentionally choose not to participate. We test the validity of these 
different dimensions using original data from a nationally-representative Political Attitudes and 
Identities Survey conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) in 2012. Upon confirming the 
existence of these various factors, we then employ existing explanatory models to determine the 
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extent to which established motivations like identity threat, economic concern, and political 
attitudes explain each type. 
 Our findings contribute to scholarly understanding of democratic behavior within a 
complex, multilevel polity like the European Union. The prior emphasis on voting behavior and 
public opinion within EU studies makes sense as the former is the most conventional form of 
participation while the latter offers a clear indicator of citizens’ perceptions of and satisfaction 
with the EU. However, we believe there is much to gain from now analyzing and comparing 
multiple other types of participation. These efforts will then allow us to better comprehend just 
how (dis)engaged the public is with the EU, and why.  
PARTICIPATION AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
 Much of the research on EU-based political participation focuses on voting in elections to 
the European Parliament (EP). Evidence suggests that the public behaves quite differently at the 
national versus European levels. Citizens have consistently demonstrated far less interest in EP 
elections than national ones. In most countries, turnout is significantly lower at the European 
level and has declined in each successive European election, from its high of 62% in 1979 to its 
lowest-ever rate of 42.6% in 2014 (“Results of the 2014 European Elections”). Some of the 
predictors of turnout in national elections have been found to also influence participation at the 
European level; compulsory voting and weekend voting, for instance, correspond with increased 
turnout at both levels (Franklin, et al 1996, Smith 1999; Mattila 2003). Other predictors of EP 
turnout are unique to the European Union. Individual-level analyses suggest that trust in the 
European Parliament and the EU more broadly promotes greater participation in EP elections 
(Blondel, et al 1998, Clark 2014). Other macro-level analyses similarly indicate that EP turnout 
increases along with aggregate levels of EU support and the amount of subsidies a country 
receives from the EU (Mattila 2003, Stockemer 2012).  
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Additionally, those that choose to vote often use EP elections as a forum to engage the 
national political sphere rather than as instruments of accountability at the European level (Reif 
and Schmitt 1980). Some individuals take EP elections as an opportunity to support a less-
competitive party that they prefer, but on which they would not waste their vote in a (more 
consequential) national election. Other individuals use EP elections to signal disapproval with 
the incumbent government’s performance since the last national election. While this second-
order elections theory is supported by a large body of evidence (e.g., Anderson and Ward 1996, 
Marsh 1998, Carrubba and Timpone 2005, Schmitt 2005, Koepke and Ringe 2006, Marsh 2007), 
more recent contributions find that some voters do use EP elections as an opportunity to address 
concerns about the EU (and not just the national government). Defections from a governing party 
to an opposition party in EP elections are more likely to occur if government supporters perceive 
of themselves as more Eurosceptic than the government (Hobolt, et al 2009) or disapprove of the 
government’s performance on EU issues (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). Altogether, whether 
voters engage in second-order behavior or, instead, actually consider the EU when making their 
EP vote choices, appears to depend on the broader information environment in which they are 
embedded. EP voters are more motivated by EU concerns when and where EP political 
campaigns, the media, and the national political environment provide more information about 
EU affairs (Weber 2007, Hobolt, et al 2009, de Vries, et al 2011, Hobolt and Spoon 2012).  
There are a number of similarities between the research agendas on EP elections and 
referenda on the EU (see Hobolt 2006). Some scholars argue that attitudes about the EU 
influences vote choices in EU referenda (Svennson 2002, Mendez, et al 2014), while others 
maintain that EU referenda resemble second-order elections by serving as a barometer of support 
for the national government (Franklin, et al 1994, Garry, et al 2005). More recent contributions 
have examined the effects of specific attitudinal judgments about the EU. For instance, 
perceiving that the EU threatens national culture increases the likelihood of a vote against further 
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integration in EU referenda (Lubbers 2008). In a similar vein, referenda voters who are prone to 
anxiety or fearfulness are more likely to vote based on the issue in question, while those 
operating in a state of anger are more likely to adhere to the second-order expectations (Garry 
2014). Much as with the research on EP elections, the work on referenda has evolved to consider 
how the political context might prompt referenda voters to focus more on EU concerns when 
casting a ballot. For instance, individuals behave more consistently with the second-order model 
when elites opt to hold a referendum due to political calculations (as opposed to a legal mandate) 
and when the results are non-binding (Hug and Sciarini 2000, Hug 2002). Additionally, political 
environments that better educate the public about the EU—such as in countries with greater 
political contestation over the issue of European integration (Franklin 2002, Hobolt 2005) or in 
which elites more frequently address this issue (Hobolt 2007)—produce referenda voters who are 
motivated more by EU concerns.  
Far less attention has been devoted to other types of political participation at the 
European level. A few studies have focused on describing non-traditional forms of collective 
action (such as protests, demonstrations and strikes) targeted at affecting policies made in the 
European Union. In one such contribution, Imig (2002) finds that, while relatively few protests 
between 1984 and 1997 were focused on the EU, the number of such events increased 
throughout the 1990s as the EU grew more salient to the public. Reising (1999) similarly 
observes spatial and temporal diffusion effects to EU protests, with protests spilling over national 
borders and increasing in number over time. However, contrary to the expectations of an ever-
increasing EU protest culture, Uba and Uggla (2011) show that the number of ‘Europrotests’ 
began to decline after 2002. By 2007, the frequency of EU-based protests declined to the 
numbers observed a decade earlier. As to the motivations behind collective action at the EU 
level, Imig (2002) suggests that fears over the economic implications of European integration 
motivate many protest groups. Given the scarcity of research on protests and (so far as we are 
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aware) the absence of research on forms of supranational political participation other than voting, 
we still know very little about whether, how, and why the public interacts with the European 
Union.   
 The emphasis on voting within the literature on democratic behavior at the EU level 
makes sense both because voting data is more readily available and the act of voting is the form 
of participation most often associated with the rights and responsibilities of democratic 
citizenship. Yet, in most advanced industrial democracies, turnout in elections is declining (Gray 
and Caul 2000) and individuals are increasingly seeking out new and different outlets to 
participate in the political process (Dalton 2000). Recognizing that individuals often seek 
alternatives to the ballot box to express themselves, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) developed a 
typology to conceptually organize different modes of participation. The early form of this 
typology included voting, campaign activity, contacting individuals directly, and communal 
activities. Dalton (2013) updates the typology to also include protest activities and internet-based 
activism.
1
 Each of these six types encompasses several participatory acts; campaign activity, for 
instance, includes giving money to a political candidate, attending a party meeting, or trying to 
persuade another voter. Different actions are classified under a particular type according to the 
likely influence of the act on decision-makers, the degree of partisan conflict involved, the effort 
required on the part of the individual, and the necessity to cooperate with others. Given the low 
turnout in European elections and the declining use of electoral mechanisms more broadly, we 
believe a more well-rounded assessment of democracy at the European level must take into 
account a broader range of participatory acts such as those introduced in the Verba, Nie and Kim 
(1978) and Dalton (2013) typologies.  
                                                           
1
 The internet has undoubtedly changed the nature of traditional participation while simultaneously opening new 
venues for engagement (e.g., Krueger 2002). An emerging vein of research explores variation in who participates 
online versus in person (e.g., Vicente and Novo 2014). 
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RETHINKING HOW CITIZENS “ENGAGE” WITH THE EU  
 Building off the typologies above, we differentiate between modes of participation 
according to an individual’s likely motivations for engaging with the European Union. Some 
individuals may act with the intention of affirming the value of the European project through 
expressions of pride, while others may seek out forms of participation, such as protest, or blatant 
non-participation, that signal their mistrust of, apathy towards, or perhaps even opposition to that 
project. Some participatory acts may be nothing more than an individual seeking to learn more 
about the European Union. Other acts may have a more utilitarian basis with individuals simply 
taking advantage of the opportunities created by European integration such as travelling to 
another EU country. Our resulting five-part classification schema differs from Verba, Nie and 
Kim (1978) and Dalton (2014) in that some of these modes of participation do not involve efforts 
to actively influence political processes (although even their typologies allows for communal 
activities). However, each of these modes involves inherently political activities where 
individuals are in some way interacting with or making use of political actors and processes at 
the European level. These are also modes of participation that we might expect from individuals 
fulfilling the role of a democratic citizenry, meaning that (in addition to voting) individuals seek 
out information about the political process, articulate their preferences through a variety of 
mechanisms and interact with others from the larger political community.  
 Thus, our conceptual framework argues that specific types of behavior can be classified 
together under four modes of participation: information-seeking, expressions of pride, taking 
advantage of opportunities created by European integration, and protest behavior. For example, 
contacting one’s MEP would be considered information-seeking; celebrating Europe Day 
constitutes an expression of pride; travelling within Europe constitutes taking advantage of some 
of the many opportunities created by the EU; and protesting against the EU falls within its own 
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category. Additionally, we believe that a handful of citizens may actively choose not to 
participate in any way, which constitutes our fifth category.  
 
BASELINE EXPLANATIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 Beyond examining whether the structure of participation does, indeed, break down into 
multiple dimensions, we seek to apply known explanations to investigate how well existing 
findings travel across these domains of EU engagement. Political participation—whether studied 
in its voting behavior or public support forms, and regardless of whether studied in the European 
or United States context—appears motivated by four sets of factors: economic concerns, identity 
threat general political interest and opinions, and demographic characteristics.  
 The standard model of almost any form of political participation begins with expectation 
that individuals will engage when doing so rationally benefits them. In support of this claim, 
individual-level positions on the EU are influenced by the actual and perceived economic costs 
and benefits of European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995, 
Anderson and Reichert 1995, Brinegar, et al 2004, Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). More 
specifically, EP vote choice is commonly attributed to retrospective voting where citizens use 
their economic circumstances to evaluate the options in front of them (e.g., Kousser 2004). 
Both partisan and political-territorial identification are known to determine one’s broader 
sociopolitical outlook and engagement (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). Social 
identity can incentivize participation when group interests are perceived to be at stake—or when 
they believe their efforts will help produce a positive outcome for their preferred group (Fowler 
and Kam 2007). In the European sphere, research often suggests that strong national attachments 
promote anxieties about the deterioration of national culture due to EU-level pressures and thus 
undermine EU support (Carey 2002, Christin and Trechsel 2002, McLaren 2002, Kritzinger 
2003). Other works maintain that individuals may hold loyalties to multiple communities 
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simultaneously and that overlapping identities may in fact be mutually reinforcing (Van 
Kersbergen 2000, Habermas 2001, Haesly 2001, Diez Medrano 2003, Klandermans, et al 2003).
2
 
At a minimum, identity attachments filter individuals’ perceptions of the EU—and typically 
more so than economic explanations (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2004). Given such findings, we 
believe that identity may well influence other types of behavior. We expect that the strength of 
an individual’s attachment to local, national and European communities influences the extent to 
which they participate at the European level. Such attachments likely increase both the desire to 
participate (and thereupon affirm one’s position within the community) and a sense of obligation 
to contribute to the larger community. While prevalent in the literature on EU support, identity-
based explanations are rarely considered within the research on EU-level participation.
3
 Yet one 
can imagine that identity has a strong effect on both traditional and non-traditional forms of 
participation. Those individuals that identify strongly with the EU may be more likely to seek out 
information about EU politics or to express pride in the European project out of a sense of civic 
duty. In contrast, stronger attachments to local or national communities may motivate protesters 
against the EU who are fearful that the EU threatens the cultural integrity or political influence of 
those communities. In fact, we expect that strong local and national identities influences all but 
one of the four modes of participation from our conceptual framework; the exception being those 
who take advantage of opportunities created by European integration. This category 
encompasses relatively value-free behaviors. For example, while especially xenophobic 
individuals may be less likely to travel outside of their own borders, we expect that individuals 
will likely make use of the freedom to travel within the EU regardless of their particular political 
                                                           
2
 The precise effect of identity-based considerations likely depends on the political context. In many EU countries, 
Eurosceptic elites have sought to activate and/or aggravate fears about the EU’s effects on national identity 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Marks, et al 2006). When and where these elites have acquired greater visibility in the 
media and in the political sphere, the public has been more likely to consider the EU as a liability for national 
culture (Hooghe and Marks 2004). 
3
 See Lubbers (2008) for an exception.  
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identity. Additionally, this category includes voting in EP elections, a form of behavior that has 
not been found to be influenced by identity-related considerations in past research.  
On the political side, several attitudes and orientations might contribute to how involved 
citizens are. Political interest is a standard prerequisite of participation (Brady, Verba, and 
Schlozman 1995). Following the news—at least in print form—can make individuals more 
participatory (McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy 1999). In Europe, attitudes towards the EU affect 
behavior at the European level; for instance, voting in EP elections is higher in countries with 
greater support for EU membership (Mattila 2003). And, as already discussed above, European 
engagement often reflects second-order motivations rather than explicitly EU-related concerns. 
Lastly, socioeconomic status is a nearly undisputed cause of (non)participation (Leighley 
1995; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Yet SES is itself a function of 
one’s resources and civic skills, as acquired through age, education, income, etc. (Brady, Verba, 
and Schlozman 1995). Thus, following the past behavior research (e.g., Lewis-Beck et al. 2008), 
increasing levels of education, income, and occupational prestige should correspond with greater 
participation across the different modes. In addition, a ‘gender gap’ often emerges for political 
involvement with men being much more politically active than women (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 
2000; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). Therefore, we expect males to be more engaged than 
females.    
DATA & METHOD 
 Because existing datasets have not included all the items with which to test our 
expectations, we utilize data from an original Political Attitudes and Identities Survey (PAIS) 
conducted in the United Kingdom during summer 2012.
4
 A London-based polling firm 
                                                           
4
 The UK is renowned for being the most eurosceptic EU member state (Spiering 2004). While our case selection is 
primarily motivated by data availability, we propose that this fact actually makes it the best place to study EU 
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administered the survey online by inviting almost 7,000 of its standing panelists to participate; 
over 2,000 did for a total response rate of nearly 31%. To ensure that the ultimate sample was 
nationally representative, the polling firm weighted the final results according to national targets 
for gender, age, social class, employment status, and geographic region based on data from the 
Office for National Statistics
5
 and National Readership Survey.
6
  
Dependent Variable: Capturing Participation 
 Most importantly, our survey included the following question: “In which, if any, of the 
following activities have you personally taken part? (Please select all that apply),” followed by 
fourteen potential activities—which were then presented as randomized options—for 
respondents to check off or leave blank in order to express their degree of EU engagement. 
Figure 1 presents the percentages of responses to these various items and suggests, as is to be 
expected, quite a bit of variation in the types of actions citizens take toward the EU. For most 
aspects, participation is indeed quite low. For instance, only 1.2% of respondents indicated that 
they had purchased an EU flag and only 1.45% reported that they had celebrated ‘Europe Day’ 
on May 9th. For other items, participation is relatively high: 60.7% of respondents said they had 
used the Euro currency and 64.74% traveled to another EU country.
7
 Interestingly, 11.34% of 
respondents marked that they had done nothing, perhaps—as we argue—openly indicating their 
true apathy toward engaging with the EU.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Given this variation, we clearly need to answer the question of whether it is the same 
individuals participating in each of these numerous dimensions of participation, or whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
engagement. Since so few UK citizens do engage with the EU, we can be that much more confident of any 
significant relationships that do emerge.  
5
 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html  
6
 http://www.nrs.co.uk/  
7
 In the middle range, 31.77% claimed they had voted in the 2009 European Parliament elections. This closely 
matches the actual UK turnout rate of 34.7% according to the European Parliament website 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html).   
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different individuals are participating in different ways. To get at this, we generated an additive 
index of the thirteen possible EU participation items (excluding the ‘Did Nothing’ option).
8
 
Figure 2 graphs the results. The mean level of EU participation per person is two items (1.92; s. 
d. = 1.53), while 0.05% of our sample reported having engaged in all items. This lends credence 
to our argument that people engage with the EU in different ways, as opposed to supporting the 
idea that certain individuals are, by nature, participators who engage in all kinds of ways while 
others are not. Importantly, nearly 23% of respondents did not participate in any way—and yet 
did not purposely assert that they did nothing but marking that survey option. This further 
validates our assertion that some citizens actively choose not to participate in EU affairs, which 
is—in its own way—then a dimension of EU engagement that should be analyzed separately 
from other types of participation.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Covariates: Explaining Participation 
 For our later analyses, we draw on extant findings surrounding the general determinants 
of participation (particularly in the EU case) to inform the potential explanatory variables we 
include. These can be summarized into four categories: identification, economic concerns, 
political considerations, and sociodemographics.
9
  
 In terms of identity, our PAIS asked respondents, “We are all part of different groups.  
Some groups are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves.  How important 
are each of the following in describing how you personally see yourself? Please consider the 
following scale, where 7 means that you identify very strongly with it and 1 means that you do 
not identify with it at all.” They then rated their degree of identification with a series of political-
territorial levels: their town or village (Local Identification), their region (Regional 
                                                           
8
 This set of items produces respectable reliability: the Cronbach’s alpha is 0.612. It increases to 0.658 when Did 
Nothing is also included. 
9
 The Appendix provides descriptive statistics for each variable. 
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Identification), the United Kingdom (National Identification), and Europe (European 
Identification).  
 Economically, we asked respondents, “In the past year, how well do you think things 
have been going when it comes to…1) The economic situation in the United Kingdom? 2) The 
financial situation of your household? 3) The employment situation in the United Kingdom? 4) 
Your personal job situation?” For each item, respondents indicated whether they perceived 
things to be going very poorly, fairly poorly, fairly well, or really well. The resulting Egocentric 
Index is a mean index combining items 2 and 4 while our Sociotropic Index is a mean index 
based on items 1 and 3. Both indices range from one to four with seven possible values in 
between. 
 We operationalize political motives for EU participation in several ways. First, the EU 
Support Index is a mean index ranging from one to seven with 25 possible values based on 
agreement or disagreement on a scale of one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) with 
four items: “Generally speaking, the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union is a 
good thing,” “Taking everything into consideration, the United Kingdom has on balance 
benefitted from being a member of the European Union,” “The European Union conjures up a 
very positive image for me,” and “The United Kingdom should leave the European Union 
altogether.”
10
 Similarly, Current EU Direction measures agreement (on the same 1-7 scale) with 
the statement, “At the present time, things are going in the right direction in the European 
Union.”
11
 L-R Ideology captures individuals’ self-placement on a standard 11-point ideological 
scale (0 = far left; 10 = far right). We tap Political Interest by reverse coding respondents’ level 
of agreement with the statement, “I am not at all interested in politics.” The resulting variable 
                                                           
10
 This last item was recoded prior to constructing the index so that higher responses indicated a stronger preference 
for staying in the EU. 
11
 We include Current EU Direction separately from the EU Support index because it taps citizens’ specific views 
toward the EU at that moment in time, whereas the latter is meant to gauge more general (aka diffuse) support for 
European integration overall. 
14 
 
ranges from low interest (one) to high interest (seven). Likewise, Follow News is based on 
agreement (on the same one to seven scale) with the statement, “I follow the news regularly.” 
And finally, PM Approval ranges from one to seven based on agreement that, “Prime Minister 
David Cameron is doing a good job.”  
 Lastly, we include a series of sociodemographic variables. Gender is measured as a 
dummy variable equal to one for Male. Education ranges from zero (none) to five (advanced 
degree). Age ranges from 18 to 81. Occupational Prestige ranges from one (employed in an 
unskilled or semi-skilled manual occupation) to five (employed in a higher 
managerial/professional/administrative profession).  Rural-Urban Residence reflects whether 
someone reports living in a rural area or village (one) versus a large town or city (four). And then 
we use separate dichotomous variables to isolate those who are Unemployed or Employed Full-
Time. 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS: DIMENSIONS OF EU ENGAGEMENT 
 We first conduct principal-components factor analysis of the various participation items 
to test our theoretical expectation that EU engagement can be broken down into multiple 
dimensions beyond just voter turnout and generic support. A four-factor solution emerges, 
supporting our conceptual framework. Table 1 organizes each item according to the factor onto 
which it loaded most highly following orthogonal varimax rotation. Seven items load onto 
Factor 1, nearly all of which seem based around aspects of participation through which 
individuals seek out and/or receive information about the EU: contacting one’s Member of 
European Parliament (MEP); contacting or visiting a local European Commission representation 
office; visiting the EU’s website; having been contacted by an interest group (e.g., trade 
federations, companies, non-governmental organizations, national associations, regional 
representations, think tanks, etc.) regarding a European-wide issue; having received mail from an 
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EU institution (e.g., the Commission, the Parliament, etc.); and hearing the EU’s anthem. The 
one exception is that the explicit ‘None of the Above’ item (aka Did Nothing) also loads best 
here—albeit, negatively while all the rest load positively.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Factor 2 is comprised of voting in the 2009 EP elections, traveling to another European 
country, and using the euro currency; these largely reflect ways in which citizens can personally 
take advantage of some of the benefits offered by EU membership. Studying abroad through the 
ERASMUS program, celebrating Europe Day, and purchasing an EU flag make up Factor 3. We 
interpret these items as ways in which citizens may express their EU pride. Lastly, as expected, 
only one item loads onto Factor 4: participating in a protest against the EU—clearly an 
expression of anti-EU sentiment. 
 Based on these confirmatory results, we proceed with analyzing whether different 
determinants explain the different modes of EU engagement. In addition to the Additive Index 
discussed above, we generate additional dependent variables based on additive indices of the 
items in each factor: Info-Seeking (alpha = 0.571), Take Advantage (alpha = 0.665), Show EU 
Pride (alpha = 0.329), and Protest Against the EU.
12
 Given its negative loading and the initial 
results above appearing to differentiate those who purposely admit they did nothing from those 
who simply checked none of the participation items, we do not include Did Nothing into the 
Info-Seeking category and instead assess it on its own.  We use OLS for four of the dependent 
variables (Additive Index, Info-Seeking, Take Advantage, and Show EU Pride) and ordered logit 
as needed for the other two (Protest Against the EU and Did Nothing). In each case, we use 
                                                           
12
 We report the resulting ranges, means, and standard deviations in the Appendix. 
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robust standard errors clustered by respondents’ region in order to account for sampling 
procedures.
13
 
CAUSAL ANALYSIS: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN TYPES OF EU 
ENGAGEMENT 
 Tables 2 and 3 present a series of models to parse out the primary explanation(s) behind 
each different dimension of EU participation. To reiterate, our categories of covariates are 
intended to capture each of the predominant explanations from existing findings on EP voting 
and public support for European integration. Thus, at this stage we are not attempting to add 
novel explanations to explain why citizens engage with the EU, but are instead focused on 
testing competing arguments from extant literature to better understand how these various sets of 
motivations might lead individuals to pursue fundamentally different avenues of EU 
participation. Importantly, apart from certain sociodemographic features (which are the most 
consistently significant set of predictors), different elements seem to explain each model. In 
other words, there is little consistency across models regarding the primary determinant of 
partaking in that type of participation. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The determinants of European engagement in general (Additive Index: Table 2, Model 1), 
closely match existing findings from the literature. More variables attain statistical significance 
here than in any other model. Rather than discuss each model item by item, we offer a number of 
figures portraying the substantive impact of the significant predictors in order of greatest to least 
from each model (Figures 3-8). As shown in Figure 1, education has the strongest effect on one’s 
overall level of participation in EU affairs; moving from having no education to holding an 
advanced degree increases engagement by 1.03 on the 0-13 scale. Support for the European 
                                                           
13
 There is no variance at the regional level for in any dependent variable, therefore we do not use multilevel 
modeling. 
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integration and age follow closely behind. National identification has the smallest impact (only 
0.2), yet a positive one nonetheless. Unsurprisingly, citizens are more likely to engage with the 
EU when they are politically interested, feel secure in their egocentric economic situation, and 
identify with Europe. Only two variables have a negative effect on participation: those who think 
the EU is currently going in the right direction and are more approving of their current national 
government are less likely to report having done much at the EU level.   
[FIGURES 3-6 ABOUT HERE] 
Interesting findings emerge when we decompose participation into its various 
dimensions. For instance, sociotropic economic concerns only matter when it comes to seeking 
out information about the EU (Table 2, Model 2 and Figure 4); the more one is worried about the 
national economic and employment situation, the less likely they are to turn to the EU. This isn’t 
the substantively strongest motivation behind Info-Seeking; education retains first place followed 
by European identification. The factors behind taking advantage of things the EU has to offer 
(e.g., traveling within the EU, using the euro, and voting in EP elections) look most like the 
determinants of participation in general. As depicted in Table 1, Model 3 and Figure 5, age and 
support for integration have fairly strong positive effects (producing approximately a 0.8 change 
in Take Advantage on a 0-3 scale) while believing the EU is presently going in the correct 
direction reduces the likelihood of participation by almost as much. And then engaging in acts 
that display one’s pride in the EU is affected by some things that do not show up elsewhere 
(Table 2, Model 4 and Figure 6). Ideology matters only here, and in a somewhat counterintuitive 
fashion: more right-leaning individuals appear more likely to do things like studying abroad 
through ERASMUS, celebrating Europe Day, or buying an EU flag. This is also the only 
participation dimension affected by regional identification. It has a negative impact that, 
substantively, almost identically rivals the positive one produced by European identification. 
However, the magnitude of effects of all predictors in this model is extremely small: the 
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strongest determinant—age (which operates in a negative fashion in this model, likely based on 
the age requirements for studying abroad)—only produces a -0.12 change in Show EU Pride on a 
0-3 scale while the weakest—regional identification—reduces the predicted value by -0.06.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 isolates the determinants of the dichotomous participation acts. Very few of ths 
standard predictors explain protesting against the EU (Model 5 and Figure 7). Expectedly, higher 
EU support is negatively related to protest—but even moving from the minimum to the 
maximum value of EU support only reduces the predicted probability of protest by -2.8%. 
Education and being male are associated with greater likelihood of engaging in a protest, but 
with even smaller substantive effects (1.8% and 0.9% respectively). Finally, the standard 
explanations for participation in general are negatively associated with explicitly admitting to 
doing nothing (Model 6 and Figure 8). The most important determinant is Current EU Direction:  
those who think everything is completely fine with how the EU is presently operating have a 
17.3% greater predicted probability of answering this item affirmatively than their counterparts 
who are most dissatisfied with the EU’s present state.   
[FIGURES 7 & 8 ABOUT HERE] 
All in all, our findings suggest that different types of EU engagement are motivated by 
different things. Very few predictors are consistently significant across all models; only some 
basic sociodemographic characteristics appear to explain every kind of participation. Education 
is the only variable that matters in every single case, and it appears to have the strongest 
substantive impact in many instances. But beyond that, identity explanations have no effect when 
it comes either taking advantage of EU benefits or protesting against the EU. Economic concerns 
play no role in several models, and where they do it appears egocentric anxieties outweigh 
sociotropic fears. General attitudes towards the EU are fairly reliable gauges of how involved 
one might be at the EU level; one’s overall support for integration affects multiple avenues of 
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EU engagement, such that people with greater EU support then participate more in EU-related 
affairs. Other political considerations (e.g., ideology, political interest, and prime minister 
approval) vary by model. Of our four sets of explanatory variables (identity, economics, politics, 
and sociodemographics), political attitudes are typically more important than other factors—but 
again, our big punchline is that no single category seems to explain all types of participation. 
Therefore, our results suggest that EU engagement, when broken down into its different possible 
avenues, is dependent on different aspects and therefore deserves much more nuanced attention 
from scholars. 
CONCLUSION 
 Our analysis extends current work on political participation at the EU level in several 
ways. First, we offer a deeper conceptualization of how EU citizens might get engaged, beyond 
the standard focus on EP voting behavior and general support for European integration. Second, 
we affirmed this five-fold typology using original data. Our unique UK survey, and 
accompanying participation question, enabled us to probe fourteen different aspects of potential 
ways for citizens to get involved at the EU level. Factor analysis and descriptive statistics 
confirmed that different individuals engage in different types of activities: information seeking, 
taking advantage of EU opportunities, showing EU pride, protest, and deliberate 
nonparticipation. We assert that this last dimension is especially important to consider and is, to 
our knowledge, something as of yet unexplored in extant work. Third, our causal analysis tested 
the four predominant explanations of participation prevalent in existing literature (economic 
concerns, identity attachments, political views, and sociodemographic characteristics) in order to 
test expectations about which category most motivates each of the five types of participation. We 
show that, both statistically and substantively, the causes of EU engagement vary depending on 
the type of activities in question—and that examining all items together in one overarching 
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participation index overlooks important variation in which determinants have the largest impact. 
While many sociodemographic items—particularly education—almost always play a role, things 
like identity (which is further broken down into numerous political-territorial levels), economic 
anxiety (separated into its egocentric and sociotropic components), and EU support (both in 
general and in regards to specific assessments of the EU’s current direction) only matter in 
certain cases.  
Altogether, we are hopeful that our efforts will encourage scholars and policymakers to 
view EU engagement in a more holistic light and to target their efforts to boost democratic 
involvement by focusing on the specific mechanisms underlying the various modes of 
participation. For instance, citizens’ identification matters mostly when it comes to showing EU 
pride, and contradicting tendencies emerge with those who report feeling European more likely 
to do things like celebrate Europe Day while those with strong regional identity much less likely 
to do so. Or, take the example of protesting against the EU. In our models, this act is most 
affected by citizens’ underlying attitudes towards integration—not economic concerns (as 
posited by previous literature). Similarly, citizens seem most likely not to participate in any way 
when they think the EU is going in the right direction. While all our findings deserve greater 
scrutiny, this last aspect raises particularly interesting implications: perhaps the apparent lack of 
democratic EU engagement is simply a function of tacit consent with the current state of EU 
affairs and greater public involvement would actually signal greater discontent with the EU 
project. 
While our investigation is limited by studying a single country (the United Kingdom) at a 
single time point (2012), we believe our findings offer new insight into what EU engagement 
looks like, what causes it, and what that means for evaluating the EU’s democratic character. 
Future studies should extend our analyses by asking survey questions that can tap these 
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numerous dimensions of EU participation in order to then afford a cross-national—and ideally 
cross-temporal—assessment of our tentative conclusions. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
Variable (Range) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Participation Variables     
Additive Index  2.022 1.529 0 13 
Info-Seeking  0.309 0.745 0 6 
Take Advantage  1.649 1.094 0 3 
Show EU Pride  0.042 0.234 0 3 
Protest Against EU  0.021 0.144 0 1 
Did Nothing  0.099 0.298 0 1 
Identity Variables     
Local Identification  4.478 1.567 1 7 
Regional Identification  4.358 1.615 1 7 
National Identification  4.734 1.572 1 7 
European Identification  3.102 1.603 1 7 
Economic Variables     
Egocentric Index  2.675 0.689 1 4 
Sociotropic Index  1.734 0.577 1 4 
Political Variables     
EU Support Index  3.476 1.511 1 7 
Current EU Direction 2.596 1.450 1 7 
L-R Ideology  5.097 2.159 0 10 
Political Interest  4.712 1.909 1 7 
Follow News  5.440 1.546 1 7 
PM Approval  3.119 1.790 1 7 
Sociodemographics     
Male  0.476 0.500 0 1 
Education  2.864 1.390 0 5 
Age 47.082 15.218 18 81 
Occupational Prestige  3.147 1.063 1 5 
Rural-Urban Residence  2.377 1.011 1 4 
Unemployed  0.029 0.169 0 1 
Employed Full-Time  0.492 0.500 0 1 
Note: n = 1,704 respondents 
 
  
23 
 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Daniel S. Ward. 1996. “Barometer Elections in Comparative 
Perspective” Electoral Studies. 15(4): 447-460.  
 
Anderson, Christopher and M. Shawn Reichert. 1995. “Economic Benefits and Support for  
Membership in the European Union: A Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Public 
Policy. 15: 231-249. 
 
Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott, and Palle Svensson. 1998. People and Parliament in the 
European Union. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.  
 
Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES: A Resource 
Model of Political Participation.” American Political Science Review 89(2): 271-294. 
 
Brinegar, Adam, Seth Jolly and Herbert Kitschelt. 2004. “Varieties of Capitalism and Political  
Divides over European Integration” in Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (eds.) 
European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Carey, Sean. 2002. “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European  
Integration?” European Union Politics. 3: 387-413.  
 
Carrubba, Cliff and Richard J. Timpone. 2005. “Explaining Vote Switching Across First- and 
Second-Order Elections” Comparative Political Studies. 38(3): 260-281. 
 
Christin, Thomas and Alexander Trechsel. 2002. “Joining the EU? Explaining Public Opinion in  
Switzerland” European Union Politics. 3: 415-443.  
 
Clark, Nicholas and Robert Rohrschneider. 2009. “Second-Order Elections versus First-Order 
Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of 
Governance” Journal of European Integration. 31(5): 645-664.  
 
Clark, Nicholas. 2014. “Explaining Low Turnout in European Elections: The Role of Issue 
Salience and Institutional Perceptions in Elections to the European Parliament.” Journal 
of European Integration 36(4): 339-356.  
 
Dalton, Russell J. 2000. “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior” Comparative Political 
Studies. 33(6/7): 912-940.   
 
Dalton, Russell J. 2013. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies. CQ Press.  
 
De Vries, Catherine E., Wouter van der Brug, Marcel H. van Egmond, and Cees van der Eijk. 
2011. “Individual and contextual variation in EU issue voting: The role of political 
information” Electoral Studies. 30(1): 16-28. 
 
Diez Medrano, Juan. 2003. Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany,  
Spain and the United Kingdom. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
24 
 
 
Eichenberg, Richard C. and Russell J. Dalton. 1993. “Europeans and the European Community:  
The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.” International Organization. 
47(4): 507-534. 
 
Eichenberg, Richard and Russell J. Dalton. 2007. “Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of  
Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973–2004.” Acta Politica. 42(2–3): 128–52. 
 
Fowler, James H., and Cindy D. Kam. 2007. “Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and 
Political Participation.” Journal of Politics 69(3): 813-827. 
 
Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Christopher Wlezien. 1994. “Attitudes toward Europe and 
referendum votes: a response to Siune and Svensson.” Electoral Studies. 13(2): 117-121. 
 
Franklin, Mark, Cees van der Eijk, and Erik Oppenuis. 1996. “The institutional context: turnout.” 
In Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin (eds.) Choosing Europe? The European 
Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan 
University Press.  
 
Franklin, Mark. 2002. “Learning from the Danish Case: A Comment on Palle Svensson’s 
Critique on the Franklin Thesis’ European Journal of Political Research. 54(6): 751-757. 
 
Gabel, Matthew and Harvey Palmer. 1995. “Understanding Variation in Public Support for  
European Integration” European Journal of Political Research. 27(3): 3-19. 
 
Garry, John, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott. 2005. “Second order versus issue voting 
effects in EU referendums: evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty referendums” European 
Union Politics. 6(2): 201-221. 
 
Garry, John. 2014. “Emotions and voting in EU referendums” European Union Politics. 15(2): 
235-254.  
 
Gray, Mark and Miki Caul. 2000. “Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization” Comparative 
Political Studies. 33: 1091-1122. 
 
Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds: 
Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. 2001. The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge, MA:  
The MIT Press.  
 
Haesly, Richard. 2001. “Euroskeptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European  
Attachment in Scotland and Wales” European Union Politics. 2: 81-102.  
 
Hobolt, Sara B. 2005. “When Europe matters: The impact of political information on voting 
behaviour in EU referendums” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 15(1): 
85-109. 
 
25 
 
Hobolt, Sara B. 2006. “Direct Democracy and European Integration” Journal of European 
Public Policy. 13(1): 153-166.  
 
Hobolt, Sara B. 2007. “Taking Cues on Europe? Voter competence and party endorsements in 
referendums on European integration” European Journal of Political Research. 46: 151-
182. 
 
Hobolt, Sara B., Jae-Jae Spoon and James Tilley. 2009. “A vote against Europe? Explaining 
defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections” British Journal of 
Political Science. 39(1): 93-115. 
 
Hobolt, Sara B. and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2012. “Motivating the European voter: Parties, issues and 
campaigns in European Parliament elections” European Journal of Political Research. 
51: 701-727. 
 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2004. “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public  
Opinion on European Integration?” PS: Political Science and Politics. 37(3): 415-420.  
 
Hug, Simon. 2002. Voices of Europe: Citizens, referendums and European integration. Boulder, 
CO: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Hug, Simon and Pascal Sciarini. 2002. “Referendums on European Integration: Do Institutions 
Matter in the Voter’s Decision?” Comparative Political Studies. 33(1): 3-36.  
 
Imig, Doug. 2002. “Contestation in the Streets: European Protest and the Emerging Euro-polity” 
Comparative Political Studies. 35(8): 914-933. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2000. “The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: 
Women’s and Men’s Voting Behavior in Global Perspective.” International Political 
Science Review 21(4): 441-463. 
 
Klandermans, Bert, Jose Manuel Sabucedo and Mauro Rodriguez. 2003. “Inclusiveness of  
Identification among Farmers in the Netherlands and Galicia” found at http://www.uni-
kiel.de/psychologie/ispp/doc_upload/klandermans_multiple_identities.pdf 
 
Kritzinger, Sylvia. 2003. “The Influence of the Nation-State on Individual Support for the 
European Union.” European Union Politics 4(2): 219-41. 
 
Lubbers, Marcel. 2008. “Regarding the Dutch ‘Nee’ to the European Constitution: A Test of the 
Identity, Utilitarian and Political Approaches to Voting ‘No’” European Union Politics. 
9(1): 59-86.  
 
Koepke, Jason R. and Nils Ringe. 2006. “The Second-Order Election model in an Enlarged 
Europe” European Union Politics. 7(3): 321-346. 
 
Kousser, T. 2004. “Retrospective Voting and Strategic Behavior in European Parliament 
Elections.” Electoral Studies 23(1): 1-21. 
 
26 
 
Krueger, Brian S. 2002. “Assessing the Potential of Internet Political Participation in the United 
States.” American Politics Research 30(5): 476-498. 
 
Leighley, Jan E., and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. “Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: 
Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations.” The Journal of Politics 61(4): 1092-
1114. 
 
Leighley, Jan E. 1995. “Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political 
Participation.” Political Research Quarterly 48(1): 181-209. 
 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. 
The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Marsh, Michael. 1998. “Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European 
Elections” British Journal of Political Science. 28(4): 591-607.  
 
Marsh, Michael. 2007. “European Parliament Elections and Loss of Governing Parties” in van 
der Brug and van der Eijk (eds.) European Elections and Domestic Politics. 51-72. Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Mattila, Mikko. 2003. “Why bother? Determinants of turnout in the European elections” 
Electoral Studies. 22: 449-468.   
 
McLaren, Lauren. 2002. “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or  
Perceived Cultural Threat?” Journal of Politics. 64(12): 551-566. 
 
McLeod, Jack M., Dietram A. Scheufele, and Patricia Moy. 1999. “Community, 
Communication, and Participation: The Role of Mass Media and Interpersonal 
Discussion in Local Political Participation.” Political Communication 16(3): 315-336. 
 
Mendez, Fernando, Mario Mendez and Vasiliki Triga. 2014. Referendums and the European 
Union: A Comparative Inquiry. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
 
“Results of the 2014 European Elections.” European Parliament (official website). 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html. Accessed February 
26, 2015.  
 
Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second Order National Elections: A 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results” European Journal 
of Political Research. 8:3-44.  
 
Reising, Uwe K. H. 1999. “United in Opposition?: A Cross-National Time-Series Analysis of 
European Protest in Three Selected Countries, 1980-1995” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 43(3): 317-342.  
 
Rohrschneider, Robert. 2002. “The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide 
Government.” American Journal of Political Science 46(2): 463-75. 
 
Schmitt, Hermann. 2005. “The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second  
27 
 
Order?” West European Politics. 28: 650-679. 
 
Schmitter, Philippe C. 2000. How to Democratize the European Union...And Why Bother? New  
York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.  
 
Smith, Julie. 1999. Europe’s Elected Parliament. Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press.  
 
Spiering, Menno. 2004. “British Euroscepticism.” European Studies 20: 127-149. 
 
Stockemer, Daniel. 2012. “Citizens’ support for the European Union and participation in 
European Parliament elections” European Union Politics. 13(1): 26-46.  
 
Svensson, Palle. 2002. “Five Danish referendums on the European Community and European 
Union: A critical assessment of the Franklin thesis” European Journal of Political 
Research. 41: 733-750.  
 
Uba, Katrin and Frederik Uggla. 2011. “Protest Actions against the European Union, 1992-2007” 
West European Politics. 34(2): 384-393.  
 
Van Kersbergen, Kees. 2000. “Political Allegiance and European Integration” European Journal  
of Political Research. 37: 1-17.  
 
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and 
Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: A 
Seven-Nation Comparison. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. 1997. “Knowing and Caring about 
Politics: Gender and Political Engagement.” The Journal of Politics 59(4): 1051-1072. 
 
Vicente, María Rosalía, and Amparo Novo. 2014. “An Empirical Analysis of E-Participation: 
The Role of Social Networks and E-Government Over Citizens’ Online Engagement.” 
Government Information Quarterly 31(3): 379-387. 
 
Weber, Till. 2007. “Campaign Effects and Second-Order Cycles: A Top-Down Approach to 
European Parliament Elections” European Union Politics. 8(4): 509-536. 
 
  
28 
 
Table 1. Factor Analysis of Participation Items 
FACTOR 1 
(2.64) 
FACTOR 2 
(1.77) 
FACTOR 3 
(1.25) 
FACTOR 4 
(1.00) 
Contacted MEP 
Voted in  
’09 EP Elections 
Studied Abroad 
through ERASMUS 
Protested Against  
the EU 
Contacted EC  
Rep. Office 
Traveled Within EU 
Celebrated  
‘Europe Day’ 
 
Visited EU Website Used the Euro Bought an EU Flag  
Contacted by  
Political Group  
About an EU Issue 
   
Received Mail from  
an EU Institution 
   
Heard EU Anthem    
Did Nothing    
Note: Factors’ eigenvalues listed in parentheses.  
Column entries report the factor onto which each item loaded most highly. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Different Participation Dimensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Additive  
Index 
Info- 
Seeking 
Take  
Advantage 
Show  
EU Pride 
Identity Variables     
Local Identification -0.030 -0.019 -0.024 0.012* 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.014) (0.006) 
Regional Identification -0.007 -0.014 0.016 -0.010** 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.004) 
National Identification 0.034** 0.014 0.018 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.002) 
European Identification 0.062*** 0.046** 0.008 0.011** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.004) 
Economic Variables     
Egocentric Index 0.130** 0.042 0.085** 0.005 
 (0.048) (0.032) (0.034) (0.010) 
Sociotropic Index -0.126* -0.082** -0.058 0.021 
 (0.064) (0.036) (0.043) (0.016) 
Political Variables     
EU Support Index 0.171*** 0.041** 0.130*** 0.008 
 (0.035) (0.017) (0.029) (0.006) 
Current EU Direction -0.087** 0.025 -0.127*** 0.014 
 (0.030) (0.018) (0.024) (0.009) 
L-R Ideology 0.020 -0.006 0.014 0.009** 
 (0.021) (0.008) (0.019) (0.004) 
Political Interest 0.070*** 0.007 0.067*** -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.009) (0.016) (0.005) 
Follow News 0.050 0.034* 0.002 0.012* 
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.022) (0.006) 
PM Approval -0.039** -0.019** -0.018 -0.000 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.004) 
Sociodemographics     
Male 0.317*** 0.145*** 0.136* 0.022 
 (0.070) (0.044) (0.065) (0.013) 
Education 0.206*** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.014** 
 (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004) 
Age 0.016*** 0.004** 0.013*** -0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Occupational Prestige 0.176*** 0.028** 0.150*** -0.005 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.027) (0.004) 
Rural-Urban Residence 0.009 -0.009 0.016 0.001 
 (0.047) (0.029) (0.025) (0.005) 
Unemployed 0.374 0.242 0.108 0.014 
 (0.346) (0.227) (0.160) (0.029) 
Employed Full-Time -0.104 -0.052 -0.039 -0.009 
 (0.111) (0.039) (0.074) (0.011) 
     
Constant -1.272*** -0.657*** -0.451* -0.153*** 
 (0.276) (0.207) (0.241) (0.042) 
N 1,704 1,704 1,704 1,704 
R-squared 0.217 0.129 0.194 0.080 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. 
Column headings reflect dependent variable in each model. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Determinants of Additional Dimensions of EU Participation 
 (5) (6) 
 Protest 
Against EU 
Did 
Nothing 
Identity Variables   
Local Identification 0.065 0.109 
 (0.103) (0.084) 
Regional Identification 0.047 -0.105 
 (0.160) (0.065) 
National Identification 0.058 -0.165*** 
 (0.197) (0.050) 
European Identification -0.142 0.023 
 (0.091) (0.048) 
Economic Variables   
Egocentric Index -0.074 -0.069 
 (0.215) (0.152) 
Sociotropic Index -0.298 -0.008 
 (0.398) (0.160) 
Political Variables   
EU Support Index -0.382** -0.267*** 
 (0.188) (0.078) 
Current EU Direction -0.013 0.329*** 
 (0.121) (0.039) 
L-R Ideology 0.081 -0.010 
 (0.080) (0.060) 
Political Interest 0.096 -0.181*** 
 (0.136) (0.045) 
Follow News 0.093 -0.116* 
 (0.168) (0.064) 
PM Approval -0.034 0.054 
 (0.106) (0.059) 
Sociodemographics   
Male 0.715** -0.178 
 (0.354) (0.163) 
Education 0.298** -0.297*** 
 (0.118) (0.072) 
Age 0.009 -0.021*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Occupational Prestige 0.094 -0.366*** 
 (0.147) (0.085) 
Rural-Urban Residence 0.074 0.022 
 (0.172) (0.076) 
Unemployed 0.307 0.555 
 (1.342) (0.401) 
Employed Full-Time -0.088 0.302 
 (0.357) (0.242) 
   
Constant -5.960*** 2.404*** 
 (1.265) (0.881) 
N 1,704 1,704 
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 0.174 
Ordered logit with robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. 
Column headings reflect dependent variable in each model. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Responses to EU Participation Items 
 
Note: n = 2,002 respondents 
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Figure 2. Range and Frequency of EU Participation
 
Note: n = 2,002 respondents 
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Figure 3. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Additive Index 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 2, Model 1 listed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Info-Seeking 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 2, Model 2 listed.  
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Figure 5. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Take Advantage 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 2, Model 3 listed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Show EU Pride 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 2, Model 4 listed.  
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Figure 7. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Protest Against EU 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 3, Model 5 listed.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Magnitude of Effects for Determinants of Did Nothing 
 
Bars indicate the substantive impact of moving from the minimum  
to maximum on each variable, holding all else at its mean. 
Calculated using Long and Freese’s (2006) spost commands in Stata. 
Only variables passing the p≤.05 significance threshold in Table 3, Model 6 listed.  
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